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Introduction 
The efficiency with which financial markets operate deter-
mines the magnitude of the contribution of this sector to 
development. A "complete" financial system is comprised by 
surplus units (savers), deficit units (investors), and financial 
intermediaries. The latter play the role of mobilizing funds 
offered by savers and making them available to investors. All 
transactions between these participants in the financial system 
involve explicit prices (interest rates) and non-interest 
transaction costs. Transaction costs are an appropriate measure 
of the degree of "friction" existing in the functioning of these 
markets. The higher the transaction costs of financial 
intermediation the less efficient the performance of financial 
markets, and the more constrained their contribution to 
development. 
Financial intermediation costs are particularly high in 
development banks operating in the rural areas of these 
economies 1 . The absence of appropriate means of transportation 
and communication in rural areas increases the costs incurred by 
lenders and borrowers. Financial regulations and complicated 
loan procedures associated with selective credit policies further 
augment the costs borne by financial intermediaries and rural 
borrowers. However, even in the absence of cumbersome loan-
targeting schemes, the operation of a conventional credit system 
will impl~ transaction costs for all participants in the loan 
contract. 
A conventional credit system involves several activities in 
the loan process that require the use of real resources, and 
therefore generate costs. These activities can be classified 
into four major groups: 
1 
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Several studies of transaction costs have been 
undertaken recently in Latin-America, the Caribbean, 
and Asia. Their results suggest that transaction costs 
for institutional lenders can reach levels several 
points higher than their usual operating margins (see 
Cuevas, 1988). 
Transaction costs of credit are defined here as all 
non-interest costs associated with loan transactions. 
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(a) Evaluation _?nd analysis of loan applications 
This stage comprises the gathering of information about the 
loan applicant, the assessing of the value of collateral, 
and/or the evaluation of the investments opportunities 
available to the prospective borrower. 
(b) Loan disbursement 
This involves making the funds available to the borrower, in 
cash or in kind, and recording and documenting the amounts 
disbursed. 
(c) Monitoring 
Usually this stage implies obtaining information about the 
performance of the borrower's investment. Monitoring is 
normally more important when loans are disbursed in several 
tranches, over an extended period of time. Technical 
assistance and supervision may be components of this stage. 
(d) Repayment 
The last step in credit transactions is loan recovery. A 
well defined system of repayment collection is essential to 
attain financial viability and maintain the size of the loan 
portfolio. 
None of these activities is sufficient by itself to 
guarantee a good performance for the financial intermediary. 
Loan evaluation and loan recovery may be the two most critical 
stages of this process, but good record-keeping and monitoring 
are still necessary to obtain satisfactory results. All four 
steps in the lending process also represent transaction costs for 
the borrower. In a conventional credit system, the borrower must 
fill out forms and supply documents to the lender in the 
applications step. In addition, several trips to the bank office 
may be necessary during the negotiation, disbursement, and 
repayment stages. 
This paper reviews and critically evaluates the major 
features of the rural credit system of Niger. The main 
components and under-developed nature of the rural credit network 
are discussed first, emphasizing the truncated role played by 
financial institutions in the system. Next, the characteristics 
and performance of the key rural credit institution, the "Caisse 
Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA), are described and analyzed. 
Finally, the magnitude and distribution of transaction costs in 
the credit network are documented, highlighting the 
disproportionate share of these costs borne by the institutions. 
Concluding remarks and implications follow. 
The Rural Credit System of Niger 
The major participants in the Nigerien rural credit system 
are: (a), the individual borrowers at the village level; (b), the 
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"groupements mutualistes'' (GMs) and cooperatives3; and (c), two 
institutions, the "Caisse Nationale de CrAdit Airicole'' (CNCA), 
and the "Union Nationale de CoopAratives" (UNC) . The CNCA is 
indeed the lending institution, whereas the UNC is the 
institution that deals directly with the cooperatives and GMs at 
the village level. 
The institutional rural financial system of Niger is 
"incomplete" in two very important ways. First, even though 
rural savings exist, they are not mobilized by the institution 
lending to agriculture. Instead, this institution relies 
exclusively upon government funds and external support. Second, 
the institutional credit network dealing with agriculture does 
not operate as a conventional and well established credit system. 
Of the four stages of the loan procedure referred to above, loan 
disbursement is probably the only phase that could be considered 
in place. However, key record-keeping practices associated with 
disbursement are deficient. Evaluation and analysis of loan 
applications do not exist, and there is no systematic loan 
recovery efforts. In-kind loans are allocated among 
cooperatives, among "groupements mutualistes" (GMs), and among 
individual borrowers based on criteria that do not consider 
creditworthiness. This is partially due to the lack of 
appropriate records in the institutions involved, and the lack of 
sufficiently trained personnel to engage in this activity. 
Three major implications of the under-development of the 
institutional credit system in Niger can be outlined at this 
point. First, the system does not and cannot perform any 
meaningful resource allocation role through financial 
intermediation. Secondly, the system does not provide the 
financial intermediary with instruments of credit rationing in 
the presence of regulations, notably the fixed interest-rate 
structure prevailing in Niger. Third, as a loan delivery system 
the credit network of Niger should be a rather low cost 
operation. Existing procedures are simple and institutional 
resources are scarce, therefore the transaction costs associated 
with the system are expected to be low. However, as will be made 
clear in this paper, this should not be interpreted as an 
indicator of efficiency. Rather, these costs will be measuring 
the resource costs involved in operating an input delivery 
system, without the key components and functions of a complete 
credit system. 
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The GMs are village-level groups that comprise a 
cooperative. 
The institution dealing with input supply, the "Central 
d'Approvisionnement" (CA), plays an important role in 
the input delivery process, but it is not considered 
here as a part of the credit network. 
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The "Caisse Rationale de Cr~dit Agricole" (CNCA): 
History and Performance 
For almost 20 years the CNCA has carried out the function of 
channeling funds, for the most part indirectly through para-
statal organizations, towards the Nigerien rural-sector. The 
CNCA was created originally as a division of the "Union 
Nationale de Credit et de Cooperation" (UNCC). The UNCC had been 
established to provide greater central control over cooperatives 
and through time had taken on a variety of functions from input 
supply, to credit distribution, peanut marketing, seed 
distribution, the management of development projects, cooperative 
education, farmer training, functional literacy, supplying 
products of primary necessity, and distributing grain in time of 
scarcity. Some of these functions were subsequently transferred 
to other specialized parastatal agencies, as in the case of the 
grain marketing agency, i.e. the "Office des Produits Vivriers 
du Niger" (OPVN), established in 1970; the "Office National des 
Amenagements Hydro-Agricoles" (ONAHA), the irrigation authority 
established in 1978; or to specialized services still within the 
UNCC, like the "Centrale d'Approvisionnement" (CA), the input 
supply agency, created in 1978 and the "Ateliers de Fabrication 
de Materiel Agricole," (the agricultural equipment workshops). 
When the credit function was passed over to the CNCA, strong 
links were maintained. For example, by law the chairman and the 
members of the board of the UNCC were respectively the chairman 
and members of the board of the CNCA. From a functional point of 
view, the representative of each agency at the regional level was 
one and the same until 1980, when the government took a firmer 
stand in trying to set up the CNCA as a full-fledged 
"agricultural credit institution." The CNCA, however, continues 
to rely heavily on the parastatal agencies both as a device for 
indirectly channeling credit to farmers and to perform some 
critical functions in identifying, selecting and monitoring its 
own direct customers. Transferring the credit function to the 
CNCA did not automatically create the necessary banking skills 
nor were the extension and follow-up skills of the parastatal 
agencies improved to perform these functions. On the contrary, 
incentives were created that made the situation worse on both 
fronts. 
The CNCA, trapped by its mission, could not afford to 
establish contact with many of its ultimate borrowers in the 
rural areas. The CNCA's role of working through other 
institutions to reach the final farm-borrower reduced its chances 
of learning how to perform effectively its own banking functions. 
It could not develop direct "bank-customer'' relationships. From 
the point of view of learning processes within the CNCA the 
situation worsened when large scale Productivity Projects (PPs) 
entered the scene. The predefined goals embedded in the PPs 
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programs and prescriptions erected a strong barrier to any 
attempt by an external institution, like the CNCA, to understand 
• and much less participate in the loan evaluation and loan 
administration activity where these projects operated. In short 
the CNCA became a mere conduit to channel funds rather than 
actively participating in the decision making process in 
assessing the risk, and credit worthiness of potential clients. 
The parastatal agencies (PAs) and the productivity projects 
(PPs), on the other hand, find in this situation incentives to 
reduce the quality of their own performance both with regard to 
the supporting services offered to the CNCA and in their own 
current operations. First, transferring loans from their books 
to the CNCA obviously reduced the concern and responsibility 
shown by their own agents in assessing the creditworthiness, 
follow-up activities and credit collection on behalf of the CNCA. 
Second, the opportunity to influence credit allocation and loan 
repayment created for the PA's and the PP's a situation in which 
the negative effects of their own, possibly inappropriate, 
technological advice and even fraud can be temporarily covered up 
with resources borrowed directly by them or by their project 
farmers. The distribution of these loan resources can mitigate 
the losses growing out of poor research and extension work and 
reduce the complaints of the farmer-borrowers if they do not have 
to be repaid. In short, as long as the loan program is labelled 
"experimental" and the experiment proves deficient, then the PA's 
and PP's can save face with their farmer-borrower by not pushing 
aggressively for loan repayment. 
Thus, paradoxically, recourse by the CNCA to the PA's and 
PP's for supporting services in credit delivery and loan 
repayment can result in creating incentives and opportunities for 
the same entities to work against rather than in support of loan 
repayment. This is to be expected when the same entity that is a 
borrower (i.e. the PA's and PP's) also assumes a role as a 
credit officer and loan collection agent for another entity which 
is its creditor such as the CNCA. The conflict of interest 
inherent in these split roles weakens and eventually destroys 
rigorous loan management and loan recovery practices. Thus the 
CNCA is defenseless because it has very limited control over the 
resources it lends. 
In this framework the financial entity is not considered an 
intrinsically useful institution in its own right, but rather a 
mere administrative device completely subordinated to the purpose 
of channelling credit toward predefined targeted uses. These 
uses are not chosen by loan beneficiaries, but by a development 
agency whose task is to stimulate the adoption of specific 
technologies or practices to increase output. Such an approach 
does not provide the incentives to develop within the financial 
institution the appropriate managerial and banking skills, needed 
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to administer a loan portfolio and develop through and a healthy 
bank-client relationship. 
Liability Ma~~gement: Instability and Vulnerability. 
The growth and change of liabilities of the CNCA is reported 
in Tables 1 and 2. Selected liabilities in Table 1 identify the 
large share of total funds borrowed through the government and 
foreign donors. The variability of the rate of growth is very 
marked among these important types of liabilities. This is 
explained by the very narrow base for change and by the 
concentration of funding sources. This extreme instability and 
lack of diversification of funding sources also affects the 
aggregate rate of change and, eventually, the overall rate of 
growth for the institution. 
The Central Bank's rediscount lines accounted for 44.7 
percent of total borrowing, on average, over the period, while 
fixed-term deposits (mostly from the Treasury) and external lines 
of credit from international donors, under very soft conditions, 
accounted respectively for 22.8 percent and 20.1 percent on 
average. At the end of 1983-84 these sources (3 in all) 
accounted for 90.59 percent of the CNCA's borrowed funds. 
The CNCA's composition of borrowed funds does not stimulate 
the development of the skills and procedures required to approach 
the general public for deposit collection. Nor does the CNCA 
benefit from the incentives that dealing with regular depositors 
from the public creates in order to improve banking skills and 
other operating procedures such as effective loan evaluation and 
risk analysis, liquidity and cash management, and loan recovery 
practices. 
In summary, when the structure of liabilities of a financial 
institution servicing agriculture is dominated by government 
rediscount lines of credit or international donor funds, the 
institution becomes "borrower-dominated". Namely, all the loan 
procedures and administrative practices are designed to favor 
borrower's interest. Detailed farm budget studies and targeted 
clientele are emphasized (to introduce new technology or increase 
output while rigorous credit-worthy analyses on the probability 
of loan repayment and loan recovery procedures and practices are 
minimized. 
In contrast, when the liability portfolio is dominated by 
deposits from the public at large, the institution becomes 
"depositor-dominated" in its operational philosophy. Loan 
management and administrative procedures are designed to favor 
and protect depositors interests. High-cost loan-targeting 
programs are minimized, while loan evaluation and credit-
worthiness analyses (including risk analyses) are emphasized. At 
the same time loan recovery procedures are highlighted and loan 
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recovery efforts are pursued aggressively. Borrower-dominated 
financial institutions frequently experience severe financial 
~ difficulties since financial viability is not a dominant 
priority. Depositor~dominated financial institutions, on the 
other hand, are usually much more solvent, since the survival of 
the financial institution is important for depositors interests 
and thus institutional viability rapidly becomes a dominant 
feature of managerial strategy. As the foregoing analyses make 
clear, the structure of liabilities (sources of funds) of the 
CNCA makes it a classic example of a borrower-dominated 
institution, dependent upon government and donor funds, with all 
the associated weaknesses of those institutions, in particular 
its lack of financial viability. 
Asset Management: Portfolio Structure and Performance 
The portfolio of financial assets of the CNCA - 99 percent 
of which consists of loans and overdrafts - recorded an average 
annual growth of 17.6 percent over the period 1979/80 ~ 1983/84 
(including doubtful loans net of loss provisions). The average 
rate of growth over the same period, excluding doubtful loans 
(see Table 2), was 16.9 percent for overdrafts, 23.1 percent for 
short term loans and 25.7 percent for medium-term loans. The 
rates of growth for each type of loan are extremely variable over 
time because of unstable seasonality coupled with end-of-period 
data and because of the very high concentration of borrowing 
entities. Abrupt shifts in program funding through government 
and international sources (noted earlier in Table 1) introduces 
equally abrupt shifts in assets. Starting in 1983/84 and 
continuing in 1984/85 Table 2 panel A shows a negative rate of 
change for all types of loans. These rapid shifts in liabilities 
and assets complicate loan management practices and compromise 
efficient loan recovery. For example, farm-borrowers (or 
cooperatives) are not inclined to repay loans to an institution 
experiencing abrupt funding problems, since the reward for 
repaying a loan (i.e. getting a new loan) appears unlikely. 
Thus a growing image of instability in funding sources will 
induce a rising rate of delinquent behavior among borrowers. 
Seventy percent of the CNCA loan portfolio consists of 
overdrafts and short-term loans while 30 percent is comprised of 
medium term loans in 1983/84 (see Table 2 Panel B). Overdrafts 
fall into five main groups (see Table 3). Crop loans until 1983-
84 consisted mostly of loans to OPVN, the grain marketing agency, 
and, to a much smaller degree, to "Riz du Niger" and "SONARA" 
(rice and peanut marketing parastatals); input supply loans 
mostly to the "Central d'Approvisionnement"; prefinancing loans 
mainly for Productivity Projects, (i.e. credit granted as an 
advance on the expected disbursement of lines of credit obtained 
from external donors or the "Fonds National d'Investissement"); 
advances to ONAHA (the Irrigation Authority) directly and to some 
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irrigation projects; and other advances on current account to 
Productivity Projects. 
Medium-term loans accounted for 46 percent of the number and 
28 percent of the value of total loans outstanding at the end of 
1984/85 (46 percent and 30 percent respectively at the end of 
1963/84}. An important although decreasing proportion of these 
loans (35 percent at the end of 1983-84 and 19 percent at the end 
of 1984/85) is accounted for by the consolidation of loans 
granted to crop marketing agencies, like OPVN, SONARA, Riz du 
Niger, and by one loan granted to the Nigieren Government (on 
which no interest is accruing according to the notes to the 
financial statement for 1983-84). The rest of the medium-term 
portfolio is represented by loans to cooperatives and to 
individuals (65 percent and 16.5 percent at the end of 1984/85; 
and 50 percent and 14.8 percent at the end of 1983-84). The main 
stated destination of loans in the case of cooperatives is the 
acquisition of collective farm equipment espe-cially within the 
Productivity Projects. Other stated purposes for individual 
loans are preparation and planting of orchards, cattle herd 
reconstitution, seed storage (mainly for groundnuts). The value 
of the average upstanding loan to cooperatives of medium-term 
maturity was CFAF 2.2 Mat the end of 1984-85 (CFAF 1.9 Mat the 
end of 1983-84) 
From the above it can be seen that the bulk of retail 
lending by the CNCA, i.e., loans directly granted to cooperatives 
and individuals, is concentrated in short-and medium-terms loans 
(see Table 3). However, as already mentioned, the proportion of 
these loans to the total value of loans outstanding is 
insignificant except for medium-term credit to cooperatives. The 
average amount per loan is so low - especially for short-term 
loans- that it is difficult to assume that the net interest 
margin is sufficient to cover operating costs. If, for example, 
the cost of funds is assumed to be equal to the preferential 
rediscount rate, this margin is fixed at 2.5 per cent, inclusive 
of commissions, for all loans to cooperatives. This means CFAF 
2.500 annually on a loan for CFAF 100,000, which represents a 
cost of about 3 man/hours of work time valued at the average cost 
of personnel for the CNCA. Clearly more time is spent processing 
these loans, even in the imperfect loan delivery system within 
the CNCA and its associated parastatal institutions5. A larger 
interest rate margin to cover these operational costs and risk is 
clearly in order. 
It is evident that the quality of the loan portfolio of the 
CNCA has been steadily deteriorating over the years. The CNCA 
reports as doubtful only those loans granted to individuals and 
5 Transaction costs of lending are evaluated in the 
following section. 
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cooperatives because it considers all other loans granted to or 
guaranteed by the Nigerien Government as secure. For example no 
• provision for loan losses has been accumulated for loans extended 
to the parastatal agencies for crop and input supply loans, for 
irrigation project loans to ONAHA, and for prefinancing loans, 
although many of these loans are clearly non-performing. 
The data for doubtful loans reported in column 5 and 6 in 
Table 3 therefore refer only to loans to cooperatives and 
individuals. The CNCA has recently increased the loss provision 
against these loans and considers 100 percent of the short-term 
credit to cooperatives and 50 percent of the short and medium-
term credit to individuals as "not recoverable." If we accept, 
for the moment, this unrealistically narrow definition of non-
performing loans, only 8.7 percent of the total loan portfolio 
was considered doubtful, and adjusted accordingly with increased 
loan loss provisions at the end of 1984-85 (4 percent for 1983-
84). An alternative, and more realistic, appraisal of the 
doubtful loan percentage would consider a substantial part of the 
loans to government parastatals as equally doubtful as those 
recently written off for cooperatives and individuals. Thus the 
misleadingly low 8.7 percent estimate in Table 3 could very 
easily be adjusted upwards to something approaching a substantial 
majority of the total portfolio. 
In this situation the stability of the institution is 
undermined in many ways. On the one hand, the absence of loan 
turnover creates great difficulties for the liquidity of the CNCA 
while, on the other hand, profitability is at stake both because 
of the increased cost of funds prompted by the liquidity crisis 
and due to the lost interest income and the loss in the value of 
assets. These effects can only be hidden partially by accounting 
practices. 
Profitability. 
The assessment of the CNCA's profitability depends 
critically on judgments concerning the real value of its assets 
and of accrued interest. Data on Revenues, Costs and Profits 
Margins are set forth in table 4 for the period 1978/79 to 
1983/84. Positive net profit and profit margins are evident in 
this data throughout the period (lines 9 and 10). These data can 
be taken at face value only if one has confidence in the data 
recorded as income from financial operations (line 1) and 
provisions for loan losses (line 4). 
The incidence of extraordinary items in line 8 is related to 
the need to take into consideration profit and loss items that 
escaped appropriate reporting in previous accounting periods. 
This item reflects the difficulty of measuring the performance of 
the CNCA. Relevant factors increasing this item are the 
inefficiency of the CNCA's information system and the dispute 
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surrounding the relationship between the CNCA and some of its 
important parastatal clients. 
In summary, the profit margin set forth in line 10, shows a 
trend of declining profits in recent years reflecting the 
deterioration of the CNCA's portfolio. However these findings 
are, in fact, greatly misleading in that actual profits (in 
contrast to accounting profits) are clearly non-existent. One 
must not forget that the item "income from financial operations" 
in line 1 forms the basis for estimating the profit estimates in 
line 9 and the prof it ratio in line 10. Theses estimates are 
based on "accrued" interest, a conventional accounting term that 
considers all the hypothetical (but unpaid} interest earnings for 
delinquent loans to all the parastatal agencies as revenue, since 
it is accruing on the books of the CNCA. If, instead, one were 
to use actual interest payments received to estimate interest 
revenue, then the CNCA would be recording losses instead of 
profits and the trends, noted above, would be increased losses 
rather than declining profits. 
Transaction Costs in the Credit Delivery System 
The assessment of the transaction costs associated with the 
CNCA credit network is undertaken at three levels: first, the 
individual borrower or household level, second, the leaders of 
GMs and cooperatives, and third, the UNC and the CNCA at their 
different levels of operation. The magnitudes of transaction 
costs for all three levels are summarized in Table 5 
Transaction Costs of Borrowing at the Household Level 
The findings reported in this section are based on a field 
survey undertaken in July-August 1985. The sample included some 
900 households throughout the different regions of Niger. There 
were two predominant types of loans in the sample of 482 
borrowers from institutions 6 : equipment loans with an average 
amount close to 132 thousand fra9cs CFA, and seed loans averaging 
only about 1 thousand francs CFA . The results discussed below 
refer to equipment loans, since seed loans consisted primarily of 
aid in kind distributed with minimum formalities. 
6 
7 
This sample of institutional borrowers is comprised by 
all interviews in the overall sample of 900 households 
that had received a loan in the five-year period 
preceding the date of the survey. A detailed 
description of the sample is included in Graham, 
Cuevas, and Negash (1986). 
1 US$ = 330 francs CFA. 
: 
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Loan procedures were in general very simple for individual 
borrowers. There were no collateral requirements in any type of 
~ loan, but equipment loans would typically require a contribution 
or downpayment by the beneficiary. The loan was usually proposed 
or suggested to the borrower by someone else (UNC agent, 
cooperative official, etc.), rather than an outgrowth of the 
borrower's own initiative. 
In a large majority of cases the equipment and inputs had 
been received on time, and in satisfactory condition. However, 
an important shortcoming of the input delivery process was the 
lack of knowledge of the correct use of the inputs received. 
Furthermore, only 50 percent of these farmers acknowledged having 
received some training in the use of the equipment and tools 
received as credit in kind. 
Thirty seven percent of the borrowers in the sample admitted 
to being delinquent in their payments. Among the borrowers of 
equipment loans, 53 percent admitted to a delinquent status. 
Insufficient revenues was the reason for non-repayment most 
frequently indicated by the farmers with overdue loans. Another 
important explanation however, was the lack of recovery efforts 
on the part of the credit institutions. 
In summary, the loan procedure can be characterized as a 
relatively expeditious delivery system of credit in-kind. The 
major shortcomings of the system are insufficient training and 
technical assistance for the borrowers, and poor loan recovery 
practices. The leaders of cooperatives and GMs appear to play an 
important role throughout the process, according to the 
individual borrowers. However, they seem to concentrate their 
efforts on the disbursement stage, neglecting the repayment 
function. 
Even though all farmers are in principle members of a GM 
(hence, of a cooperative), the group itself does not perform a 
clear role in the operation of the system. There is no 
collective responsibility for the loans received, nor group 
pressure to repay or group support for those in arrears. The 
group appears to operate primarily as a meeting place to 
communicate the availability of credit and collect the names of 
interested villagers. These functions will certainly reduce 
transaction costs of borrowing, but will not improve the efficacy 
of the system as a resource allocation mechanism. 
The measurement of transaction costs of borrowing at the 
household level considers two major components: first, the 
explicit expenses associated with traveling to other places to 
apply for and negotiate the loan, receive the disbursements, and 
repay the loan, and second, the opportunity cost of the time 
spent in performing the activities involved in the different 
12 
steps of the loan procedure. The opportunity cost of time was 
valued at 514 francs CFA per days. 
The transaction costs of borrowing for the individual 
farmers are reported in Table 5. The costs borne by individual 
farmers are rather low by most standards. One percent of the 
amount of the loan represents less than one-tenth of the usual 
interest rates charged on loans (11-13 percent}. Studies 
conducted in other developing economies have found transaction 
costs equivalent to at least 30 percent of the explicit interest 
rate, and as high as twice the level of the lending rate. As 
suggested earlier, these low cost levels reflect the incipient 
development of the credit system, rather than a highly efficient 
operation. Most of these costs are generated at the disbursement 
stage, a finding that reinforces the impression that the Nigerien 
credit network performs primarily input delivery functions alone. 
The results presented thus far suggest that individual 
farmers benefit from relatively low transaction costs of 
borrowing institutional loans. The simplicity of the input 
delivery system and the cost economies involved in operating 
through their group organizations explain these low transaction 
costs incurred by individual borrowers. 
Transaction Costs at the GM and Cooperative Level 
This section relies upon data obtained in interviews with 
the leadership of 24 cooperatives and 73 "groupements 
mutualistes" (GMs} carried out in January-February 1986. 
According to these interviews, the responsibility of deciding the 
distribution of credit among individuals was shared by the 
leaders of GMs, of the cooperatives, and by the representatives 
of the UNC. The CNCA, i .. e., the lending institution, was 
perceived as playing a major role in these decisions in only 7 
percent of the cases. Numerous criteria were indicated for 
allocating credit to the individual beneficiaries. The criteria 
most frequently cited by GM and cooperative leaders were the 
individual's ability to repay, the place in the list of 
applicants, and the ability to provide a deposit ("caution"}. 
Less than half of the leaders interviewed were in possession of 
records indicating who was eligible for a loan among the members 
of the group. Only 18 percent had records or documentation 
indicating the amounts received by each farmer. These findings, 
consistent with the level of literacy documented in the survey, 
suggest that records about eligibility for credit and loan 
8 Estimated value added per day per active person, based 
in the figures of rural GDP per capita reported in 
Cuevas (1987), the proportion of active population over 
total derived from the 1977 census, and an estimated 
ratio of value added to GDP of 0.6. 
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disbursements are kept in "memorized" form by the leaders of the 
• organizations, rather than in written form. 
The distribution of responsibilities in loan recovery were 
not clear. Most cooperative leaders felt that recovery was a 
role to be performed by the UNC official, whereas GM leaders 
attributed this function to the cooperative leaders. Basic 
information for loan recovery, i.e., debt records, existed in 
only one-half of the cases. 
The characteristics of the credit process at the GM and 
cooperative levels outlined above reinforce the notion that this 
credit network operates primarily as an input delivery channel. 
Input distribution appears to be performed with relative 
efficiency. The system fails in the areas of loan-allocation 
decisions, documentation of debts, and loan recovery. In all 
these areas responsibilities and roles are not clearly assigned, 
and essential records and documentation are absent or deficient. 
It is not surprising then that the costs of operating the system 
at this level are minimal, as shown in Table 5. 
Overall, the low costs per CFA borrowed are demonstrating 
the advantages of group borrowing, i.e., of handling large 
(multiple) loans through the common leadership of the 
organization. The low cost per loan however, is indicating the 
lack of sophistication of the loan procedure. Moreover, it is 
reflecting the deficiencies of key loan allocation practices, the 
poor documentation of disbursements, and the limitations of loan 
recovery procedures. 
Operational Costs of' Lending at the Institutional Level 
The field survey undertaken in January-February 1986 
included interviews with 14 officials of the "Union Nationale de 
Cooperatives" (UNC) and 5 branch managers of the "Caisse 
Nationale de Credit Agricole" (CNCA). UNC officials devoted less 
than half of their time to credit-related activities, whereas 
CNCA personnel, as expected, were dedicated exclusively to 
perform their credit functions. These differences in the 
allocation of time were taken into account to compute the costs 
associated with credit activities. 
It is evident from the figures presented in Table 5 that the 
institutions in question bear a large proportion of the costs 
associated with the credit delivery system. The CNCA alone shows 
operational costs per cooperative in the portfolio equivalent to 
5.44 percent of the average loan amount per cooperative. The UNC 
activity at the arrondissement level also results in rather 
substantial operational costs of lending. 
It must be noted that the costs reported in Table 5 do not 
include the expenses incurred at the central off ices of the UNC 
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and the CNCA. This implies that those costs still under-estimate 
the total transaction costs of operating the credit delivery 
system. Given the distribution of personnel of the CNCA between 
the central office (43 percent) and the branches (57 percent), 
one could assume an overhead of about 75 percent attributable to 
central-office expenses. With this assumption, the CNCA costs 
per CFA lent increase to 9.52 percent, and the combined costs of 
the CNCA and the UNC raise to almost 12 percent of the amounts 
lent. 
Finally, it must be recalled here that the costs measured 
above for the CNCA correspond only to the non-interest costs of 
loan administration. These do not include the costs of funds 
(essentially determined by the BCEAO discount rates), or the risk 
premium or default cost. The latter reflects the effects of 
default risk on total transaction costs of lending of the 
institution. 
For the CNCA, the risk premium was estimated at 25.6 
percent, using an estimated default rate of 18 percent of the 
CNCA portfolio9 , the 9.5 percent administration costs reported 
above, and the preferential discount rate of the BCEAO as the 
cost of funds of 8 percent. This still represents a lower-bound 
estimate since no assumption has been made about the default risk 
involved in the loans granted to the government and to public and 
semi-public enterprises. 
With loan administration costs of 9.5 percent and a risk 
premium of 25.8 percent, total transaction costs of lending of 
the CNCA become 35.3 percent of the amounts lent. This is 
certainly a very high costs of lending, by any standards. This 
cost must be contrasted against the 2.5-percent margin allowed by 
the BCEAO for on-lending to the CNCA and other banks. The 
lending costs of the CNCA exceed by about 33 percent this 
regulated margin, i.e., the CNCA incurs losses of 33 percent of 
the amount of loans granted every year. 
In summary, even though the credit delivery system of Niger 
does not include a complete set of well developed banking 
practices, the resulting costs of the system appear even higher 
than those recorded in development banks of other low-income 
countries. Even without devoting sufficient resources to key 
activities such as loan evaluation and loan recovery, the costs 
of implementing the deliv~ry of inputs to the cooperatives and 
GMs are significant. The operations of the CNCA result in an 
annual loss equivalent to (at least) 33 percent of the funds lent 
by this institution. 
9 This default rate does not consider loans to government 
institutions and parastatals. 
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Concluding Remarks and Implications 
The deteriorating performance of the CNCA in recent years 
can be largely traced to poor loan management procedures and 
practices and to an operational philosophy that prevents the 
institution from maturing sufficiently to play a relatively 
"autonomous" role as a true intermediary. The institution has 
been forced to channel its loan funds to final borrowers on the 
basis of loan evaluation actions carried out by employees of 
other organizations. It has been compromised, further, in having 
these same agents of other parastatal organizations undertake 
loan recovery efforts on its behalf. In short, in being 
relegated to a wholesaling role, it has not been able to act as a 
bank with a staff acquiring on-site loan evaluation, risk 
management, and loan recovery skills. 
The instability of funding sources in the structure of 
liabilities of the CNCA also introduces uncertairity into the 
CNCA's loan programs and complicates loan administration. 
Furthermore, with all funding coming from international donors or 
the government's rediscount lines, the CNCA has become a 
"borrower-dominated" institution. Its organizational framework 
has created incentives to promote procedures and practices 
favoring borrower's interests. Targeting criteria to reach 
selected farmers with new inputs is emphasized, while 
creditworthiness, risk analysis and loan recovery procedures and 
efforts are minimized. The financial viability of the 
institution is not an overriding priority. Continual infusions 
of funds have been needed to subsidize the high lending costs 
associated with the expensive delivery of loans through an 
incomplete "truncated" credit system experiencing growing default 
rates. 
Total non-financial costs of operating the CNCA credit 
system are 9.14 percent of the amount of credit channeled from 
the institution to the individual borrowers. If the estimated 
central-off ice costs of the CNCA are included in this estimate, 
total transaction costs per CFA in the credit delivery system 
increase to 13.22 percent. The largest share of these costs is 
borne by the participating institutions (86 percent of the 
total), i.e., the public sector is supporting the large majority 
of the costs of the credit delivery system. Credit beneficiaries 
have access to in-kind loans at low transaction costs, but the 
costs incurred by the institutions involved are significant. 
This paper has shown that the institutional agricultural 
credit system of Niger is for the most part limited to the input 
delivery (credit disbursement) role. Despite the deficiencies of 
key lending practices the costs of the system are substantial. 
The major implications anticipated earlier in this paper can be 
restated and revised here. First, the system in its current 
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state does not and cannot perform a resource allocation role 
through financial intermediation. Secondly, the system does not 
provide the financial intermediary with instruments of credit 
rationing, i.e., risk management, autonomous loan evaluation, and 
overall portfolio management. A serious and focused effort at 
institutional autonomy is necessary before the CNCA can become 
viable and the rural credit system a self-sustaining, permanent 
institution in Niger. 
. 
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TABLE 1 
Annual Change and Percentage 
Composition of CNCA Liabilities 1979-80 to 1983-8' 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
( 1} ( 2 } (3) 
A. Annual Percentage Change 
Liabilities 
Central Bank 4.01 0.73 15.32 
Checking Accounts 208.20 5.80 273.52 
Current Accounts 64.18 352.02 - 45.81 
Banks 6i: 
Correspondents 236.64 54.58 - 24.39 
Fixed Term 
Deposits 126.52 - 17.48 17.46 
Ext. Lines of 
Credit 270.20 39.01 - 10.27 
Total 60.2 10.3 9.7 
B. Percentage Composition 
Central Bank 42.5 38.3 40.2 
Checking Accounts 2.7 2.6 8.8 
Current Accounts 1. 7 1.0 3.5 
Banks & 
Correspondents 4.9 6.9 4.7 
Fixed Term 
Deposits 30.2 22.6 24.3 
Ext. Lines of 
Credit 17.9 22.6 18.5 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 
.1982-83 
(4) 
67.51 
- 23.03 
4.66 
- 66.43 
9.51 
18.52 
49.3 
54.8 
5.5 
2.7 
1. 3 
17.8 
17.9 
1983/84. 
1983-84 
(5) 
- 25 .17 
- 15.90 
27.75 
-100.00 
8.87 
13.73 
14.3 
47.9 
5.4 
4.1 
18.9 
23.7 
TABLE 2 
Annual Change and Percentage Coaposition of the Financial Assets of the CNCA 
1978/79 to 1984/85 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
(1) (2J_ (3) (4) (5) (6) __ t7) 
financial Assets 
A. Annual Percentage Change 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank ---- - 57.5 541.0 - 78.0 112.7 - 21. 9 
Banks & Correspondents ---- 119.6 37.8 - 96.0 284.3 349.5 
Overdrafts ---- 37.8 5.5 21.0 36.4 - 16. 1 - 5.6 
Short-term Loans ---- - 30.6 155.9 - 10.6 14.4 - 13.8 -80.8 
Medi1.1m-term Loans ---- 111. 9 18.1 - 0.9 3.5 - 4.0 -23.8 
Doubtful Loans less 
Provisions ---- ---- 29.2 66.2 - 63.9 -100.0 
Total ---- 52.9 13.3 10.8 24.0 - 12.9 
B. Percentage Composition 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank 0.4 0.1 0.7 0. 1 0.2 0.2 
Banks & Correspondents 0.6 0.9 1. 0 0.04 0.1 0.6 
Overdrafts 69.7 62.8 58.5 63.9 70.3 67.7 
Short-term Loans 3.5 1.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.6 
Medium-term Loans 24.3 33.7 35.1 31.4 26.2 28.9 
Doubtful Loans less 
Provisions 1.5 1. 0 1 . 1 1.6 0.5 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 and unpublished data in CNCA files for 
1984/85. 
• • J ~ 
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Beneficiaries 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of Loans by Type of Beneficiary, Term Structure, and 
Selected Attecors Indicators for the CNCA Credit Portfolio 
1984-85 
Number of Accounts Amount Outstanding Doubtful Loans 
(000[000 CFA} (000[000 CFA} 
. - . 
Doubtful Loans 
( % l 
Date 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.84 30.9.85 30.9.~~~85 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3) (4) ( 5) ( 6) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
Medi um.--=---1'.erm 
Cooperatives 1. 160 1.160 2299.4 2531. 8 31.4 362.3 1. 37 14.31 
OSEMs 5 5 596.3 383.0 ---- ----- ---- -----
State 1 1 1016.1 338.2 ---- ----- ---- -----
Individuals 3.219 3.219 665.2 641.0 300.2 298.3 45.13 46.54 
Short - Term 
Cooperatives 1. 548 1. 548 208.7 256.3 10.8 256.3 5.13 100.00 
Individuals 3.396 3.396 202.0 143.5 74.8 69.7 37.13 48.58 
Overdrafts 
Crop loans 2 1 2522.2 150.9 ---- -----
Input supply 5 5 2629.0 3430.3 ---- -----
Pref inancing 16 16 762.9 567.1 ---- -----
Advances ONAHA and 
AHA 43 43 2072.7 2390.9 ---- -----
Other Advances on 
c/a 111 111 2164.8 3084.9 189.3 220.0 8.74 7.13 
Total 9506 9505 15199.4 13918.0 606.7 1206.7 3.99 8.67 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84 and unpublished data from CNCA files. 
N 
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TABLE 4 
Revenues, Costs, and Profit Margins for the CHCA 
1978/7 to 1983/' , 
(in millions .of CPA Prances) 
1978/79 1979Lao 1980L81 1981/82 1982L83 1983L8• 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5) (6) 
l. Income from 
Financial 
Operations 537.5 1030.8 1281.5 1664.0 2230.6 1899.5 
2. Charges on 
ClfCA Borrowings 282.5 537.9 682.5 1053.6 1486.3 1001.5 
3. Gross Margin on 
Financial 
Intermediation 255.0 492.9 599.0 610.4 744.3 898.0 
4. Provisions for 
Loan Losses 42.6 80.0 217.9 159.6 222.5 360.8 
5. Met Margin on 
Fi·nancial 
Intermediation 212.4 412.9 391.1 450.8 521.8 537.2 
6. Operational 
Costs 165.5 181.4 308.9 291.0 324.9 285.2 
7. Operating 
Margin 46.9 231.5 72.2 159.8 196.9 252.0 
8. .Extraordinary 
Items -6.1 -15.0 +78.7 -19.8 +3.7 -65.l 
9. Net Prof it 40.8 216.5 150.9 140.0 200.6 186.9 
10. Profit Margin 
(%)* 7.6 21.0 11.8 8.4 9.0 9.8 
Net profit/Income from financial operations (Col. 9/Col. 1 ) . 
SOURCE: CNCA, Rapport d'Activite, 1982/83 and 1983/84. 
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TABLE 5 
Insti tutioral Credit. SUDmary of Transaction Costs Incurred by 
Different Participants at Different Levels of the Credit He'b«>rk 
I.evel I Participant 
Boaaebold Level 
Individual borrower 
CM Level 
a.t leaders 
U?£, Arrondissement 
Ur«::, Department 
SUb-total a.t level 
OOoperative Level 
Cooperative leaders 
UNC, Arrondissement 
Ur£, Department 
CNCA, Department 
Average Cost 
per Loan 
CFA 
1,120.7 
1,843.2 
2,823.3 
218.4 
4,884.9 
1,969.6 
29,288.7 
2,699.4 
90,238.5 
sub-total cooperative level 124,196.2 
Total Transaction Costs per CPAa 
SWrmary by participant: 
Individual borrower 
a.t and cooperative leaders 
Institutions 
UNC 
CNCA 
Source: OSU SU.rveys, 1985 and 1986. 
Average 
Loan Aroount 
CFA 
131,557.0 
604,583.9 
1,659,960.8 
Cost per 
CFA 
% 
0.85 
0.30 
0.47 
0.04 
0.81 
0.12 
1.76 
0.16 
5.44 
7.48 
9.14 
0.85 
0.42 
2.43 
5.44 
a Does not include costs of the central off ice of the CNCA. If these 
are considered the total cost per CFA increases to 13.22 percent. 
